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March, 2018

 

 

 

NEWS-UPDATE
ISSUE

100

 

 In this issue

 

 

*         The Infiltration of U.S. Control Systems

*         Best Practice ICS Protection

*         Industrial Cybersecurity Predictions 2018

*         Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors

*         Latest Cyber Security NewsLatest Cyber Security News

 

about the Cyber Security News update

The Cyber News Update is an activity of the Cyber Research Center - Industrial Control Systems and intended to reach out to all Cyber Security Professionals interested in industrial / critical infrastructure threats, protection & resilience. For more information visit the CRC-ICS website at www.crc-ics.net or www.cyber-research-center.net

 

The Infiltration of U.S. Control Systems

March 28, 2018

 

CERT Alert TA18-074A removed any doubts that hostile nation-states are actively targeting U.S. industrial control systems.

On March 15, 2018, we all learned that the long-discussed cyber-attack on industrial control systems (ICS) had actually happened. Of course, many attacks on ICSs have happened before, but this one—with the backing of a nation-state—is the one that has been most feared.

This incursion, conducted by Russia, is not of the kind that can be classified alongside hacks by disgruntled employees, rogue hackers looking to extort funds, or corporate espionage attempts. The Russian hacking of U.S. critical infrastructure and manufacturing is different. It is an act of modern warfare with industry in its crosshairs.

Nick Bilogorskiy, cybersecurity strategist at Juniper Networks, said, “The nature of armed conflicts has changed dramatically…in the modern world, cyberwarfare can be used by a foreign entity to launch a devastating attack against the United States without a single bomb or missile. Cyber-attacks have been used in a broader strategy of information warfare. Some examples are denial of service attacks, espionage malware, dissemination of disinformation and propaganda, social media election manipulation, and website or Twitter defacements.”

He goes on to say that, because cyber-attacks are difficult to attribute to a source—since proxies, third parties and fake artifacts in malware code are used to obfuscate their true origin—“it is easier to understand who attacked you than it is to be able to prove it. In this case, [however], the Department of Homeland Security and theFBIpubliclycondemned Russian government cyber actors, which to me means they found significant evidence of Russian involvement.”

In its TA18-074A Alert on the attack, the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT), noted that the Russian government has targeted “U.S. Government entities as well as organizations in the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation and critical manufacturing sectors.” The U.S. government considers the critical manufacturing sectors to be the primary metal, machinery, electrical equipment and transportation equipment manufacturing industries.

To better understand what this means for the Automation World audience of manufacturers and processors, we reached out to industry experts to better understand how this attack happened, how it affects you and what you should be doing about it.

How it happened

“The U.S.-CERT alert characterizes these attacks as a multi-stage intrusion campaign to gain remote access into targeted industrial networks,” said Thomas Nuth, director of products and solutions at cybersecurity technology supplier Nozomi Networks. “After obtaining access, the threat actors (i.e., Russian government cyber actors) conducted network reconnaissance to collect information pertaining to ICS. Such behavior is typical of APTs (advanced persistent threats).”

Three specific methods of obtaining information that enabled access to company networks were cited in the alert:

·         Watering holes. The CERT alert notes that the “threat actors compromised the infrastructure of trusted organizations to reach intended targets. Approximately half of the known watering holes are trade publications and informational websites related to process control, ICS or critical infrastructure. Although these watering holes may host legitimate content developed by reputable organizations, the threat actors altered websites to contain and reference malicious content.

    See related article detailing the steps Automation World employs to avoid being used as a watering hole.

·         Phishing emails. “Threat actors used email attachments to leverage legitimate Microsoft Office functions for retrieving a document from a remote server using the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol…this request authenticates the client with the server, sending the user’s credential hash to the remote server before retrieving the requested file…the threat actors can [then] use password-cracking techniques to obtain the plaintext password. With valid credentials, the threat actors are able to masquerade as authorized users in environments that use single-factor authentication,” the CERT alert states.

·         Analyzing publically available information, such as pictures, where ICS devices are visible. The alert noted that some means of access were gained via publicly posted corporate images in which SCADA screens were visible. The attackers were able to glean information from those pictures to determine information about the systems used by the targeted companies.

Once access to the company network is gained, Nuth noted that ICS reconnaissance, which begins by using the kinds of methods detailed above, extends to such tactics as:

·         The use of batch scripts to enumerate the industrial control network;

·         Using scheduled tasks and a screenshot utility to capture the screens of systems across the network; and

·         Accessing computers on the corporate network to gather data output about control and SCADA systems, including ICS vendor names and reference documents as well as gathering profile and configuration information.

“Reconnaissance is a crucial component of conducting an attack,” said Barak Perlman, co-founder and CEO of cybersecurity technology supplier Indegy. “Hackers are patient and often spend time collecting information which can include things like source code. That, in and of itself, may not reveal the keys to the ICS kingdom, but source code, along with other information gleaned along the way, can be amassed and used against the target organization.”

The impact on industry

Most media coverage of these attacks focused on U.S. energy facilities, which is understandable considering their role as the source of power for nearly everything we do. But the CERT alert made clear the threat from these attacks extends far beyond the energy sector.

“Really, any manufacturer and processor is fair game,” said Perelman. “Recently we have seen concerning trends and activity at water facilities and in the food and beverage, chemical and pharmaceutical industries.”

With regard to this specific adversary (i.e., Russia) and the threat these attacks have exposed via the CERT alert, Patrick McBride, chief marketing officer for cybersecurity technology supplier Claroty, said, “the most likely targets are manufacturers involved in developing defense-related systems and other critical infrastructure. This includes both the manufacturers of these systems as well as those in the supply chain that make key, limited supply, specialty components.”

But Perelman was quick to point out that highlighting the industries in which the most activity has been seen does not indicate that other organizations are immune. “These types of threats can be amorphous and quickly change based on opportunities,” he said. “ICS/SCADA systems share similar technologies across different verticals. For example, ransomware can attack and delete a Windows PC, regardless of its use. Similarly, malware can be designed to shut down any PLC/DCS controller across its path. As a result, every industrial company is vulnerable to such an attack as part of collateral damage.”

Underlying the need for manufacturers and processors of all types and sizes to take notice, Stefan Woronka, director and head of business development at Siemens Industrial Security Services, said, “With our customers over the past 12 months, we have seen that the size of the organization does not matter. A company can be a target independent of its size.”

He added that a common attack practice is to “look for the weakest link in the chain and try to crack it. In a modern and interconnected world, [this means] the focus may shift towards companies with a lower protection level.”

Looking at the threat to industry based on what this CERT alert has confirmed, Eddie Habibi, CEO of PAS (a supplier of process safety, cybersecurity and asset reliability software), says it illustrates that “the entire supply chain is exposed. If you think about how many different companies supply products and services to a single industrial facility and how many companies provide products and services to those companies, you begin to get a sense of how difficult it is to secure the supply chain.“

Even though attack specifics were not provided in the CERT alert, Habibi said it’s important for every company to realize that any supply chain is only as strong as its weakest link. In response to this alert, he expects to see industrial companies begin requiring “cybersecurity certifications similar to process improvement programs, such as Six Sigma, demanding suppliers implement and abide by cybersecurity best practices.”

See other predictions Habibi made for industrial cybersecurity in 2018.

What about remote access?

One of the biggest trends to hit both the process and discrete manufacturing industries over the past five years has been remote access. Though practiced for decades in the oil and gas sector to maintain widely dispersed field equipment, remote access technologies have proliferated recently as a means for OEMs to develop new maintenance business models and for engineers to keep tabs on operations at any time, from anywhere.

Will news of the Russian incursion into U.S. control systems put a damper on this trend?

Habibi contends that the short answer to this question is: No. “Digitalization of the plant, which includes remote access, the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and more, is inevitable. The benefits are too great and companies are committed to investing in digitalization,” he said.

Pointing out that remote access is just one means of potential access for a hacker, Woronka said that other avenues should be of equal concern. “Remote access may be one approach, another might exploit the company’s office IT environment,” he said. “All methods of connection to the external environment require special attention.”

“There is always a knee-jerk reaction when an alert like this is issued,” said Perelman. “So, in the short term, we will likely see a blip of organizations adjusting their remote access. The real question is what will happen four to six months from now when this alert becomes yesterday’s news. Changing remote access is not the silver bullet to holistically tackling the ICS issue. If it were, companies would have implemented it long ago.”

As you can infer from the comments above, everyone responding to my questions for this article concurred that they do not see these attacks as a deterrent to continued investment in remote access or other connected, digital industry trends.

“The very components—sensors, connectivity and smart applications—that enable digitalization have now exposed the industrial sector to greater security risks,” said Habibi. This means that “ongoing digitalization investments must include cyber risk mitigation plans.

He added that he expects to see cybersecurity programs in the future dovetail more closely with existing safety management programs, such as process hazards analysis.

“In the long term it’s obvious that technology advancement can’t be stopped, and things like remote access are a must to make our facilities and companies more efficient,” said Perelman. “The notion of anywhere connectivity will only increase in the future. For example, we’ve seen financial institutions being attacked again and again, but nobody is deleting their bank app from their smartphone. People responsible for ICS security need to take a more thoughtful approach that doesn’t just solve for something that already happened, but also addresses threats and vulnerabilities that are yet to come.”

So what should you do?

Considering that the CERT alert essentially outlines a typical APT, which occurs over an extended period of time, this means significant opportunity exists to detect and stop ICS attacks before damage can be done.

For detailed lists of specific actions you can take to assess and secure your ICS systems, see this companion article.

“With the right type of ICS monitoring and threat intelligence technology deployed within an ICS, APTs can be detected at their early stages,” said Nuth. “This is why ICS cybersecurity solutions that passively monitor, analyze and baseline normal operations using artificial intelligence methods are the most effective in extending the utility of typical protective cybersecurity technologies, such as industrial firewalls, SNMP network monitoring software and SIEM (security information and event management) products.”

When asked about the ability of anomaly detection—one of the more touted features of modern ICS cybersecurity software—to protect against such incursions before changes are made, all respondents agreed that anomaly detection would not be the feature that saves the day.

“Anomaly detection can only detect changes once they are made, and by then it can be too late,” said Perelman. Many attacks are “architected to be ‘low and slow’ so that the anomaly threshold is never reached.”

This “low and slow” approach often leave marks, however, that can be detected by anomaly detection software.

“All cyber-attacks take place in multiple steps, as defined in Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain,” said McBride. “Attackers need to do recon, gain a foothold on the network and move laterally in the network toward the end target, such as a PLC or an engineering workstation. Only then they can they make process-impacting changes.”

These steps put “anomalous” traffic on the network before making changes, according to McBride. “Anomaly detection systems are designed to notice and alert on the early steps in the kill chain so the good guys can stop the attack before process-impacting changes are made,” he said.

Perelman stressed that, because every system, architecture and operation is different, it is important to avoid a knee-jerk reaction in response to the CERT alert. “Making a change to one thing can often over up another vulnerability that is bigger than the first,” he said.

Although maintaining a patched IT system and educating employees of best security practices will prevent 90 percent of common cyber intrusions, Perelman noted that, when it comes to the other 10 percent—specifically within ICS networks—patching and antiviruses are often not a valid option. In recognition of this ICS reality, Perelman recommends deploying a monitoring solution designed specifically to deal with the ICS environment. According to Perelman, the core requirements for such products include:

·         The ability to help build an asset inventory of industrial devices that are on the network, along with their associated risk level and vulnerability; and

·         The ability to detect malicious activity—whether reconnaissance or actually damage—in real time and in a deterministic fashion.

Beyond the cybersecurity recommendations in the CERT alert and those linked to from this article (see link above), Habibi noted another important facet of ICS cybersecurity all companies should heed—"having a backstop in case all other security controls prove insufficient in keeping the bad guys out.Companies need technology that monitors for unauthorized change and processes to investigate change based on asset risk profiles.But when all else fails, they must have good backups and tested business continuity plans in place because the stakes are too great”.

 

More info https://www.automationworld.com/article/industry-type/all/infiltration-us-control-systems?utm_source=News_Insights&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=AW%20NI-2018-04-09-Acromag%20-%20actual&spMailingID=19326483&spUserID=MzcxMDc4Njc5NjM1S0&spJobID=1240305392&spReportId=MTI0MDMwNTM5MgS2

Best Practice ICS Protection

March 28, 2018

In light of the attacks on U.S. industrial networks by Russian government cyber actors, as noted in U.S. CERT Alert TA18-074A, this checklist of steps will help guide you in better securing your operations.

 

“First of all, every company should be concerned,” said Stefan Woronka, director and head of business development at Siemens Industrial Security Services, speaking about the cybersecurity threats to industry exposed in the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) TA18-074A Alert. Pointing out that it’s not just energy sector industrial companies that need to take heed of the issues revealed in the CERT alert, Woronka says, “all industries Siemens supports face cybersecurity challenges.”

 

Given that the list of detection and prevention measures provided in the U.S. CERT alert is so extensive, Moreno Carullo, founder and chief technical officer at Nozomi Networks, a supplier of industrial cybersecurity technology, said it’s important for users to realize there is a key technique used to accomplish the type of monitoring recommended by CERT. That technique is hybrid threat detection. “This involves the use of signatures plus behavior-based anomaly detection to identify threats,” he said. “The results are correlated with each other and with operational context, providing rapid insight into what is happening, thereby reducing mitigation time.”

 

Carullo notes that YaraRules is “a signature approach” to hybrid threat detection in that it consists of “a library of advanced scripts that check for the presence of malware IOCs (indicators of compromise). YaraRules aggregates checking for multiple IOCs for malware to reduce manual threat detection work.” He adds that, because YaraRules is developed by an open community of global security researchers, the YaraRules library “innovates as fast as the collective body of knowledge.”

 

Whenever the government puts out a warning, Carullo says it's a good time for organizations to take note and prioritize or re-prioritize their cybersecurity defenses. With that advice in mind, here are his recommendations following the release of CERT Alert TA18-074A:

 

·         Set firewall policies to restrict outbound communication services. Block SMB as an allowed outbound communication protocol.

·         Ensure passwords are complex and long. Use two-factor authentication whenever possible.

·         Direct people to change passwords regularly, especially passwords related to critical systems and administrator passwords.

·         Communicate to staff the seriousness of the situation, asking everyone to be on guard for suspicious emails, activities or people at facilities.

·         Have key staff available and on standby emergency mode.

·         Review your incident response and outage plans.

·         Review all administrator accounts. Identify and disable unauthorized ones.

·         Make sure that physical defenses are high. If there are hardware keys to prevent programming of ICS systems, they should be checked to make sure they are not left in program mode.

·         Prioritize the checking of networks for anomalous behavior and Indicators of Compromise (IOCs).

·         Eradicate IOCs from networks.

·         Harden firewall rules, restricting both inbound and outbound communication between networks and segments within the industrial networks. This includes restricting outbound protocols to a minimum set, which excludes SMB.

·         Implement real-time cybersecurity and operational visibility technologies that will help provide early warning Advanced Threat Protection (APT), and allow action to be taken to eradicate infections before they cause damage.

·         Implement real-time monitoring and alert correlation to reduce the workload involved in checking for the presence of IOCs.

 

As a critical step in securing industrial facilities on an ongoing basis, Woronka says Siemens recommends that a company “complete a thorough analysis of their assets and then establish a holistic security concept that brings together IT and OT. The Holistic Security Concept, as we call it, helps to answer key questions for business security, including: What do I need to protect in my business? What level of security do I need? How do I protect specific assets?”

 

Woronka says the holistic security method used by Siemens integrates requirements from both IEC 62443 and ISO 27001 to provide a focus on both IT and OT requirements. (More information about this can accessed at www.siemens.com/industrialsecurity.) The initial steps to conducting this process include determining the most valuable assets within the scope of protection as well as the potential threats and impacts.

 

“Based on this information, a threat and risk analysis can be conducted,” he says. “This provides a good overview about which assets require a higher protection level.”

 

To establish a holistic security approach that includes defense-in-depth based on IEC 62443, Woronka says users should consider splitting the process into three major categories:

 

·         Transparency for Assessment. This involves gaining transparency into the production environment.

·         Implementing a defense-in-depth architecture with different measures. This may include firewalls for network segmentation, hardening of the endpoints, implementation of a robust patch management program, use of endpoint software such as whitelisting or antivirus, proper user and access management, and management of remote connectivity. “These measures usually are considered basic cyber hygiene,” he said. “They simply need to be there.”

·         Cybersecurity Management. The implemented system and architecture needs to be kept up to date and monitored via regular patching, maintenance of antivirus protection, installation of firewalls and so on.

 

Read more: https://www.automationworld.com/article/industry-type/all/best-practice-ics-protection

Industrial Cybersecurity Predictions 2018

March 14, 2018.

Outside of critical infrastructure and large global companies, most manufacturers have eyed the need for cybersecurity protection somewhat at arms length. They know they need it and they have increasingly been taking serious steps to better protect their systems. In response, the industrial cybersecurity market has generated a lot of helpful information and expanded with the addition of several new companies.

Disclosing a Critical Infrastructure Cyber Attack Will Be Mandatory

Habibi notes that the lack of a mandate to disclose attacks on corporations “continues to hinder accurate intelligence gathering and the development of targeted defensive strategies against an evolving threat landscape.” He expects the U.S. will follow the European Union’s lead, and that Congress will begin to hold hearings that include mandating disclosures of cyber attacks within certain critical infrastructure industries.

Nation-State Cyber Alliances Will Become the New Norm

As an added step beyond new governmental requirements, such as the mandatory disclosure example listed above, Habibi thinks countries will begin discussing the creation of cybersecurity alliances. “Establishing these alliances will provide mutual defense for all countries involved and will allow for the sharing of intelligence in the face of attributed nation-state attacks, not to mention agreements to not attack each other,” he said. Habibi added that the idea of cyber-physical non-proliferation treaties will begin gaining traction. He said that such treaties will “likely forgo any promise of governmental investigation when non-critical infrastructure companies or individuals are the target of cyberattacks.”

Cybersecurity and Process Safety Will No Longer Operate in Silos

We’ve been covering the integration of IT and operations technology (OT) in industry quite a bit—and for good reason—as this is where the rubber will meet the road in terms of cybersecurity. “The process industries have long depended on technologies, such as Emergency Shutdown and Safe Operating Limit systems, to mitigate and minimize the consequences of a catastrophic incident,” Habibi said. “As these systems take on the dual role of cyber defense, we predict that companies will require tight integration between cybersecurity applications and their operational risk and safety management strategies.”

If nothing else causes small to mid-sized manufacturers to take note of their need for greater cybersecurity protections, demands to do so from the companies they supply could be the turning point.

Companies Will Demand Supply Chain Security

If nothing else causes small to mid-sized manufacturers to take note of their need for greater cybersecurity protections, demands to do so from the companies they supply could be the turning point. Habbi said he expects companies to begin placing greater demands on their suppliers for security certifications and audit reporting. “Cyber supply chain certification requirements will have similarities to process improvement programs, such as Six Sigma, demanding suppliers implement and abide by cybersecurity best practices,” he said

ICS Will Jump into the Cyber Insurance Game

Habibi noted that, because most operations technologies are “invisible to security personnel, insurance companies have long faced challenges understanding true risk within a facility and will continue to struggle with writing policies specific to these environments.” However, industrial companies that can “gain visibility into all their cyber assets, as well as monitor and mitigate risk, will have better options for insuring the heart of their operations,” he said. To aid this, Habibi expects to see more comprehensive ICS cybersecurity policies offered by insurance companies.

The “Kaspersky Effect” Will Spread

Russia has been in the news so much this past year that you may have missed moves by the U.S. federal government to ban the use of Kaspersky anti-virus software on government systems. The U.S. military was the first to do so, well in advance of other federal agencies. However, Habibi cautioned that Russia should not be our only concern in this area. “Other countries have shown similar nationalistic tendencies, such as China and its recently passed, far-reaching cybersecurity law that requires access to vendor source code,” Habibi said. “We predict that the U.S. Executive Branch will show similar tendencies and direct government agencies to exercise procurement preference for vendors with development and manufacturing in the U.S. or allied countries. Software companies will form a loose coalition to lobby for global standards for protection of intellectual property considering the burgeoning cybersecurity risks.”

Watch the OT Security Market Thin Out

With all the new entrants into this space over the past two years, the thinning of the ranks in this sector in not unexpected. Habibi expects some of these startups will “struggle to gain significant market adoption from industrial companies concerned with business continuity and safety,” he said. “Expect network anomaly detection companies with significant market share in enterprise IT to enter the OT market through acquisitions and alliances, ushering in a new phase of consolidation.”

 

More Info https://www.automationworld.com/industrial-cybersecurity-predictions

 

 

 

Alert (TA18-074A) Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors

March 16, 2018.

Systems Affected

    Domain Controllers

    File Servers

    Email Servers

Overview

This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This alert provides information on Russian government actions targeting U.S. Government entities as well as organizations in the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors. It also contains indicators of compromise (IOCs) and technical details on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by Russian government cyber actors on compromised victim networks. DHS and FBI produced this alert to educate network defenders to enhance their ability to identify and reduce exposure to malicious activity.

DHS and FBI characterize this activity as a multi-stage intrusion campaign by Russian government cyber actors who targeted small commercial facilities’ networks where they staged malware, conducted spear phishing, and gained remote access into energy sector networks. After obtaining access, the Russian government cyber actors conducted network reconnaissance, moved laterally, and collected information pertaining to Industrial Control Systems (ICS).

 

For a downloadable copy of IOC packages and associated files, see:

 

·         TA18-074A_TLP_WHITE.csv

·         TA18-074A_TLP_WHITE.stix.xml

·         MIFR-10127623_TLP_WHITE.pdf

·         MIFR-10127623_TLP_WHITE_stix.xml

·         MIFR-10128327_TLP_WHITE.pdf

·         MIFR-10128327_TLP_WHITE_stix.xml

·         MIFR-10128336_TLP_WHITE.pdf

·         MIFR-10128336_TLP_WHITE_stix.xml

·         MIFR-10128830­_TLP_WHITE.pdf

·         MIFR-10128830­_TLP_WHITE_stix.xml

·         MIFR-10128883_TLP_WHITE.pdf

·         MIFR-10128883_TLP_WHITE_stix.xml

·         MIFR-10135300_TLP_WHITE.pdf

·         MIFR-10135300_TLP_WHITE_stix.xml

 

Contact DHS or law enforcement immediately to report an intrusion and to request incident response resources or technical assistance.

Description

Since at least March 2016, Russian government cyber actors—hereafter referred to as “threat actors”—targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors.

Analysis by DHS and FBI, resulted in the identification of distinct indicators and behaviors related to this activity. Of note, the report Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group, released by Symantec on September 6, 2017, provides additional information about this ongoing campaign. [1] (link is external)

This campaign comprises two distinct categories of victims: staging and intended targets. The initial victims are peripheral organizations such as trusted third-party suppliers with less secure networks, referred to as “staging targets” throughout this alert. The threat actors used the staging targets’ networks as pivot points and malware repositories when targeting their final intended victims. NCCIC and FBI judge the ultimate objective of the actors is to compromise organizational networks, also referred to as the “intended target.”

Technical Details

The threat actors in this campaign employed a variety of TTPs, including

·         spear-phishing emails (from compromised legitimate account),

·         watering-hole domains,

·         credential gathering,

·         open-source and network reconnaissance,

·         host-based exploitation, and

·         targeting industrial control system (ICS) infrastructure.

Using Cyber Kill Chain for Analysis

DHS used the Lockheed-Martin Cyber Kill Chain model to analyze, discuss, and dissect malicious cyber activity. Phases of the model include reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on the objective. This section will provide a high-level overview of threat actors’ activities within this framework.

Stage 1: Reconnaissance

The threat actors appear to have deliberately chosen the organizations they targeted, rather than pursuing them as targets of opportunity. Staging targets held preexisting relationships with many of the intended targets. DHS analysis identified the threat actors accessing publicly available information hosted by organization-monitored networks during the reconnaissance phase. Based on forensic analysis, DHS assesses the threat actors sought information on network and organizational design and control system capabilities within organizations. These tactics are commonly used to collect the information needed for targeted spear-phishing attempts. In some cases, information posted to company websites, especially information that may appear to be innocuous, may contain operationally sensitive information. As an example, the threat actors downloaded a small photo from a publicly accessible human resources page. The image, when expanded, was a high-resolution photo that displayed control systems equipment models and status information in the background.

Analysis also revealed that the threat actors used compromised staging targets to download the source code for several intended targets’ websites. Additionally, the threat actors attempted to remotely access infrastructure such as corporate web-based email and virtual private network (VPN) connections.

Stage 2: Weaponization

 

Spear-Phishing Email TTPs

Throughout the spear-phishing campaign, the threat actors used email attachments to leverage legitimate Microsoft Office functions for retrieving a document from a remote server using the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. (An example of this request is: file[:]//<remote IP address>/Normal.dotm). As a part of the standard processes executed by Microsoft Word, this request authenticates the client with the server, sending the user’s credential hash to the remote server before retrieving the requested file. (Note: transfer of credentials can occur even if the file is not retrieved.) After obtaining a credential hash, the threat actors can use password-cracking techniques to obtain the plaintext password. With valid credentials, the threat actors are able to masquerade as authorized users in environments that use single-factor authentication. [2

Use of Watering Hole Domains

One of the threat actors’ primary uses for staging targets was to develop watering holes. Threat actors compromised the infrastructure of trusted organizations to reach intended targets. [3] Approximately half of the known watering holes are trade publications and informational websites related to process control, ICS, or critical infrastructure. Although these watering holes may host legitimate content developed by reputable organizations, the threat actors altered websites to contain and reference malicious content. The threat actors used legitimate credentials to access and directly modify the website content. The threat actors modified these websites by altering JavaScript and PHP files to request a file icon using SMB from an IP address controlled by the threat actors. This request accomplishes a similar technique observed in the spear-phishing documents for credential harvesting. In one instance, the threat actors added a line of code into the file “header.php”, a legitimate PHP file that carried out the redirected traffic.

Stage 3: Delivery

When compromising staging target networks, the threat actors used spear-phishing emails that differed from previously reported TTPs. The spear-phishing emails used a generic contract agreement theme (with the subject line “AGREEMENT & Confidential”) and contained a generic PDF document titled ``document.pdf. (Note the inclusion of two single back ticks at the beginning of the attachment name.) The PDF was not malicious and did not contain any active code. The document contained a shortened URL that, when clicked, led users to a website that prompted the user for email address and password. (Note: no code within the PDF initiated a download.)

In previous reporting, DHS and FBI noted that all of these spear-phishing emails referred to control systems or process control systems. The threat actors continued using these themes specifically against intended target organizations. Email messages included references to common industrial control equipment and protocols. The emails used malicious Microsoft Word attachments that appeared to be legitimate résumés or curricula vitae (CVs) for industrial control systems personnel, and invitations and policy documents to entice the user to open the attachment.

Stage 4: Exploitation

The threat actors used distinct and unusual TTPs in the phishing campaign directed at staging targets. Emails contained successive redirects to http://bit[.]ly/2m0x8IH link, which redirected to http://tinyurl[.]com/h3sdqck link, which redirected to the ultimate destination of http://imageliners[.]com/nitel. The imageliner[.]com website contained input fields for an email address and password mimicking a login page for a website.

When exploiting the intended targets, the threat actors used malicious .docx files to capture user credentials. The documents retrieved a file through a “file://” connection over SMB using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) ports 445 or 139. This connection is made to a command and control (C2) server—either a server owned by the threat actors or that of a victim. When a user attempted to authenticate to the domain, the C2 server was provided with the hash of the password. Local users received a graphical user interface (GUI) prompt to enter a username and password, and the C2 received this information over TCP ports 445 or 139. (Note: a file transfer is not necessary for a loss of credential information.) Symantec’s report associates this behavior to the Dragonfly threat actors in this campaign. [1] (link is external)

Stage 5: Installation

The threat actors leveraged compromised credentials to access victims’ networks where multi-factor authentication was not used. [4] To maintain persistence, the threat actors created local administrator accounts within staging targets and placed malicious files within intended targets.

Establishing Local Accounts

The threat actors used scripts to create local administrator accounts disguised as legitimate backup accounts. The initial script “symantec_help.jsp” contained a one-line reference to a malicious script designed to create the local administrator account and manipulate the firewall for remote access. The script was located in “C:\Program Files (x86)\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection Manager\tomcat\webapps\ROOT\”.

Scheduled Task

In addition, the threat actors created a scheduled task named reset, which was designed to automatically log out of their newly created account every eight hours.

VPN Software

After achieving access to staging targets, the threat actors installed tools to carry out operations against intended victims. On one occasion, threat actors installed the free version of FortiClient, which they presumably used as a VPN client to connect to intended target networks.

Password Cracking Tools

Consistent with the perceived goal of credential harvesting, the threat actors dropped and executed open source and free tools such as Hydra, SecretsDump, and CrackMapExec. The naming convention and download locations suggest that these files were downloaded directly from publically available locations such as GitHub. Forensic analysis indicates that many of these tools were executed during the timeframe in which the actor was accessing the system. Of note, the threat actors installed Python 2.7 on a compromised host of one staging victim, and a Python script was seen at C:\Users\<Redacted Username>\Desktop\OWAExchange\.

Downloader

Once inside of an intended target’s network, the threat actor downloaded tools from a remote server. The initial versions of the file names contained .txt extensions and were renamed to the appropriate extension, typically .exe or .zip.

In one example, after gaining remote access to the network of an intended victim, the threat actor carried out the following actions:

    The threat actor connected to 91.183.104[.]150 and downloaded multiple files, specifically the file INST.txt.

    The files were renamed to new extensions, with INST.txt being renamed INST.exe.

    The files were executed on the host and then immediately deleted.

    The execution of INST.exe triggered a download of ntdll.exe, and shortly after, ntdll.exe appeared in the running process list of the compromised system of an intended target.

    The registry value “ntdll” was added to the “HKEY_USERS\<USER SID>\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” key.

Persistence Through .LNK File Manipulation

The threat actors manipulated LNK files, commonly known as a Microsoft Window’s shortcut file, to repeatedly gather user credentials. Default Windows functionality enables icons to be loaded from a local or remote Windows repository. The threat actors exploited this built-in Windows functionality by setting the icon path to a remote server controller by the actors. When the user browses to the directory, Windows attempts to load the icon and initiate an SMB authentication session. During this process, the active user’s credentials are passed through the attempted SMB connection.

Stage 6: Command and Control

The threat actors commonly created web shells on the intended targets’ publicly accessible email and web servers. The threat actors used three different filenames (“global.aspx, autodiscover.aspx and index.aspx) for two different webshells. The difference between the two groups was the “public string Password” field.

Stage 7: Actions on Objectives

DHS and FBI identified the threat actors leveraging remote access services and infrastructure such as VPN, RDP, and Outlook Web Access (OWA). The threat actors used the infrastructure of staging targets to connect to several intended targets.

Internal Reconnaissance

Upon gaining access to intended victims, the threat actors conducted reconnaissance operations within the network. DHS observed the threat actors focusing on identifying and browsing file servers within the intended victim’s network.

The threat actors used Windows’ scheduled task and batch scripts to execute “scr.exe” and collect additional information from hosts on the network. The tool “scr.exe” is a screenshot utility that the threat actor used to capture the screen of systems across the network. The MD5 hash of “scr.exe” matched the MD5 of ScreenUtil, as reported in the Symantec Dragonfly 2.0 report.

In at least two instances, the threat actors used batch scripts labeled “pss.bat” and “psc.bat” to run the PsExec tool. Additionally, the threat actors would rename the tool PsExec to “ps.exe”.

DHS observed the threat actors create and modify a text document labeled “ip.txt” which is believed to have contained a list of host information. The threat actors used “ip.txt” as a source of hosts to perform additional reconnaissance efforts. In addition, the text documents “res.txt” and “err.txt” were observed being created as a result of the batch scripts being executed. In one instance, “res.txt” contained output from the Windows’ command “query user” across the network.

 

In addition to the batch scripts, the threat actors also used scheduled tasks to collect screenshots with “scr.exe”. In two instances, the scheduled tasks were designed to run the command “C:\Windows\Temp\scr.exe” with the argument “C:\Windows\Temp\scr.jpg”. In another instance, the scheduled task was designed to run with the argument “pss.bat” from the local administrator’s “AppData\Local\Microsoft\” folder.

Targeting of ICS and SCADA Infrastructure

In multiple instances, the threat actors accessed workstations and servers on a corporate network that contained data output from control systems within energy generation facilities. The threat actors accessed files pertaining to ICS or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Based on DHS analysis of existing compromises, these files were named containing ICS vendor names and ICS reference documents pertaining to the organization (e.g., “SCADA WIRING DIAGRAM.pdf” or “SCADA PANEL LAYOUTS.xlsx”).

The threat actors targeted and copied profile and configuration information for accessing ICS systems on the network. DHS observed the threat actors copying Virtual Network Connection (VNC) profiles that contained configuration information on accessing ICS systems. DHS was able to reconstruct screenshot fragments of a Human Machine Interface (HMI) that the threat actors accessed.

This image depicts a reconstructed screenshot of a Human Machine Interface (HMI) system that was accessed by the threat actor. This image demonstrates the threat actor's focus and interest in Industrial Control System (ICS) environments.

Cleanup and Cover Tracks

In multiple instances, the threat actors created new accounts on the staging targets to perform cleanup operations. The accounts created were used to clear the following Windows event logs: System, Security, Terminal Services, Remote Services, and Audit. The threat actors also removed applications they installed while they were in the network along with any logs produced. For example, the Fortinet client installed at one commercial facility was deleted along with the logs that were produced from its use. Finally, data generated by other accounts used on the systems accessed were deleted.

Threat actors cleaned up intended target networks through deleting created screenshots and specific registry keys. Through forensic analysis, DHS determined that the threat actors deleted the registry key associated with terminal server client that tracks connections made to remote systems. The threat actors also deleted all batch scripts, output text documents and any tools they brought into the environment such as “scr.exe”.

Detection and Response

IOCs related to this campaign are provided within the accompanying .csv and .stix files of this alert. DHS and FBI recommend that network administrators review the IP addresses, domain names, file hashes, network signatures, and YARA rules provided, and add the IPs to their watchlists to determine whether malicious activity has been observed within their organization. System owners are also advised to run the YARA tool on any system suspected to have been targeted by these threat actors.

Network Signatures and Host-Based Rules

This section contains network signatures and host-based rules that can be used to detect malicious activity associated with threat actor TTPs. Although these network signatures and host-based rules were created using a comprehensive vetting process, the possibility of false positives always remains.

Impact

This actors’ campaign has affected multiple organizations in the energy, nuclear, water, aviation, construction, and critical manufacturing sectors.

Solution

DHS and FBI encourage network users and administrators to use the following detection and prevention guidelines to help defend against this activity.

Network and Host-based Signatures

DHS and FBI recommend that network administrators review the IP addresses, domain names, file hashes, and YARA and Snort signatures provided and add the IPs to their watch list to determine whether malicious activity is occurring within their organization. Reviewing network perimeter netflow will help determine whether a network has experienced suspicious activity. Network defenders and malware analysts should use the YARA and Snort signatures provided in the associated YARA and .txt file to identify malicious activity.

Detections and Prevention Measures

 

    Users and administrators may detect spear phishing, watering hole, web shell, and remote access activity by comparing all IP addresses and domain names listed in the IOC packages to the following locations:

·         network intrusion detection system/network intrusion protection system logs,

·         web content logs,

·         proxy server logs,

·         domain name server resolution logs,

·         packet capture (PCAP) repositories,

·         firewall logs,

·         workstation Internet browsing history logs,

·         host-based intrusion detection system /host-based intrusion prevention system (HIPS) logs,

·         data loss prevention logs,

·         exchange server logs,

·         user mailboxes,

·         mail filter logs,

·         mail content logs,

·         AV mail logs,

·         OWA logs,

·         Blackberry Enterprise Server logs, and

·         Mobile Device Management logs.

    To detect the presence of web shells on external-facing servers, compare IP addresses, filenames, and file hashes listed in the IOC packages with the following locations:

·         application logs,

·         IIS/Apache logs,

·         file system,

·         intrusion detection system/ intrusion prevention system logs,

·         PCAP repositories,

·         firewall logs, and

·         reverse proxy.

·         Detect spear-phishing by searching workstation file systems and network-based user directories, for attachment filenames and hashes found in the IOC packages.

·         Detect persistence in VDI environments by searching file shares containing user profiles for all .lnk files.

·         Detect evasion techniques by the actors by identifying deleted logs. This can be done by reviewing last-seen entries and by searching for event 104 on Windows system logs.

·         Detect persistence by reviewing all administrator accounts on systems to identify unauthorized accounts, especially those created recently.

·         Detect the malicious use of legitimate credentials by reviewing the access times of remotely accessible systems for all users. Any unusual login times should be reviewed by the account owners.

·         Detect the malicious use of legitimate credentials by validating all remote desktop and VPN sessions of any user’s credentials suspected to be compromised.

·         Detect spear-phishing by searching OWA logs for all IP addresses listed in the IOC packages.

·         Detect spear-phishing through a network by validating all new email accounts created on mail servers, especially those with external user access.

·         Detect persistence on servers by searching system logs for all filenames listed in the IOC packages.

·         Detect lateral movement and privilege escalation by searching PowerShell logs for all filenames ending in “.ps1” contained in the IOC packages. (Note: requires PowerShell version 5, and PowerShell logging must be enabled prior to the activity.)

·         Detect persistence by reviewing all installed applications on critical systems for unauthorized applications, specifically note FortiClient VPN and Python 2.7.

·         Detect persistence by searching for the value of “REG_DWORD 100” at registry location “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal”. Services\MaxInstanceCount” and the value of “REG_DWORD 1” at location “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\policies\system\dontdisplaylastusername”.

·         Detect installation by searching all proxy logs for downloads from URIs without domain names.

General Best Practices Applicable to this Campaign:

·         Prevent external communication of all versions of SMB and related protocols at the network boundary by blocking TCP ports 139 and 445 with related UDP port 137. See the NCCIC/US-CERT publication on SMB Security Best Practices for more information.

·         Block the Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) protocol on border gateway devices on the network.

·         Monitor VPN logs for abnormal activity (e.g., off-hour logins, unauthorized IP address logins, and multiple concurrent logins).

·         Deploy web and email filters on the network. Configure these devices to scan for known bad domain names, sources, and addresses; block these before receiving and downloading messages. This action will help to reduce the attack surface at the network’s first level of defense. Scan all emails, attachments, and downloads (both on the host and at the mail gateway) with a reputable anti-virus solution that includes cloud reputation services.

·         Segment any critical networks or control systems from business systems and networks according to industry best practices.

·         Ensure adequate logging and visibility on ingress and egress points.

·         Ensure the use of PowerShell version 5, with enhanced logging enabled. Older versions of PowerShell do not provide adequate logging of the PowerShell commands an attacker may have executed. Enable PowerShell module logging, script block logging, and transcription. Send the associated logs to a centralized log repository for monitoring and analysis. See the FireEye blog post Greater Visibility through PowerShell Logging for more information.

·         Implement the prevention, detection, and mitigation strategies outlined in the NCCIC/US-CERT Alert TA15-314A – Compromised Web Servers and Web Shells – Threat Awareness and Guidance.

·         Establish a training mechanism to inform end users on proper email and web usage, highlighting current information and analysis, and including common indicators of phishing. End users should have clear instructions on how to report unusual or suspicious emails.

·         Implement application directory whitelisting. System administrators may implement application or application directory whitelisting through Microsoft Software Restriction Policy, AppLocker, or similar software. Safe defaults allow applications to run from PROGRAMFILES, PROGRAMFILES(X86), SYSTEM32, and any ICS software folders. All other locations should be disallowed unless an exception is granted.

·         Block RDP connections originating from untrusted external addresses unless an exception exists; routinely review exceptions on a regular basis for validity.

·         Store system logs of mission critical systems for at least one year within a security information event management tool.

·         Ensure applications are configured to log the proper level of detail for an incident response investigation.

·         Consider implementing HIPS or other controls to prevent unauthorized code execution.

·         Establish least-privilege controls.

·         Reduce the number of Active Directory domain and enterprise administrator accounts.

·         Based on the suspected level of compromise, reset all user, administrator, and service account credentials across all local and domain systems.

·         Establish a password policy to require complex passwords for all users.

·         Ensure that accounts for network administration do not have external connectivity.

·         Ensure that network administrators use non-privileged accounts for email and Internet access.

·         Use two-factor authentication for all authentication, with special emphasis on any external-facing interfaces and high-risk environments (e.g., remote access, privileged access, and access to sensitive data).

·         Implement a process for logging and auditing activities conducted by privileged accounts.

·         Enable logging and alerting on privilege escalations and role changes.

·         Periodically conduct searches of publically available information to ensure no sensitive information has been disclosed. Review photographs and documents for sensitive data that may have inadvertently been included.

·         Assign sufficient personnel to review logs, including records of alerts.

·         Complete independent security (as opposed to compliance) risk review.

·         Create and participate in information sharing programs.

·         Create and maintain network and system documentation to aid in timely incident response. Documentation should include network diagrams, asset owners, type of asset, and an incident response plan.

Report Notice

DHS encourages recipients who identify the use of tools or techniques discussed in this document to report information to DHS or law enforcement immediately. To request incident response resources or technical assistance, contact NCCIC at NCCICcustomerservice@hq.dhs.gov (link sends e-mail) or 888-282-0870 and the FBI through a local field office or the FBI’s Cyber Division (CyWatch@fbi.gov (link sends e-mail)or 855-292-3937).

References

    [1] Symantec. Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated attack group. September 6, 2017. (link is external)

    [2] CERT CC. Vulnerability Note #672268

    [3] CCIRC CF17-010 UPDATE

    [4] MIFR-10127623

Revisions

March 15, 2018: Initial Version

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Read the whole information at the US-ICS CERT website.

Read more: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A

Latest Cyber Security News

Individuals at Risk

Identity Theft

Orbitz Data Breach Impacts 880,000 Payment Cards: Expedia-owned travel website Orbitz announced on Tuesday that it has discovered and addressed a data security incident affecting hundreds of thousands of users. SecurityWeek, March 20, 2018

Cyber Privacy

Senate committee wants to grill Zuckerberg over Facebook data scandal: A US Senate committee wants Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to testify on the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which revealed how Facebook users’ data was used by the consulting firm to influence the 2016 US Presidential election. RT, March 23, 2018

Investigators raid offices of Cambridge Analytica after search warrant granted: Investigators from Britain’s data watchdog have spent nearly seven hours searching the London offices of Cambridge Analytica. The Guardian, March 23, 2018

Fresh Cambridge Analytica Revelations on Election Hacking, Facebook Faces FTC Investigation: According to a new report by the Guardian, Cambridge Analytica was offered politicians’ hacked emails and personal data about the future Nigerian president. InfoSecurity, March 22, 2018

1.5B Accounts? Facebook’s Epic Free Data Giveaway Could Be The Largest Privacy Breach Ever: It wasn’t a data breach. It was a data give-away, a yard sale where every price was free. Forbes, March 22, 2018

Mark Zuckerberg’s Reckoning: ‘This Is a Major Trust Issue’: For much of the past week, Facebook has been embroiled in a controversy involving Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting firm with ties to Donald J. Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, and how the firm improperly obtained and exploited personal data from 50 million Facebook users. The New York Times, March 21, 2018

Facebook-Cambridge Analytica Scandal Explained in 10 Simple Points: Facebook has been in the news for all the wrong reasons ever since media reports alleged that a data-mining firm called Cambridge Analytica acquired private data harvested from more than 50 million Facebook users to support Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential election campaign. Cambridge is alleged to have also played a role in in other elections around the world, with Information Technology Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad on Wednesday questioning if India’s Congress party had any ties to the company, a charge the Rahul Gandhi-led party has denied. Gadgets360, March 21, 2018

Facebook’s Surveillance Machine: In 2014, Cambridge Analytica, a voter-profiling company that would later provide services for Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, reached out with a request on Amazon’s “Mechanical Turk” platform, an online marketplace where people around the world contract with others to perform various tasks. Cambridge Analytica was looking for people who were American Facebook users. It offered to pay them to download and use a personality quiz app on Facebook called thisisyourdigitallife. The New York Times, March 19, 2018

Cyber Update

Windows Remote Assistance Tool Can Be Used for Targeted Attacks. A patch for the issue —tracked as CVE-2018-0878— was included with the March 2018 Patch Tuesday, released last week.: The Windows Remote Assistance tool that ships with all Windows distributions can be can be abused for clever hacks in targeted attacks. BleepingComputer, March 20, 2018

Cyber Defense

Time to get a new router? Symantec researchers say Inception Framework is hijacking vulnerable old routers . Is your old router a hacking group’s APT pawn?: If you’ve been looking for another reason to replace your old Wi-Fi router, here it is: A group of hackers could be using it to hide the origins of its online attacks. The Parallax, March 20, 2018

Cyber Warning

15-Year-old Finds Flaw in Ledger Crypto Wallet: A 15-year-old security researcher has discovered a serious flaw in cryptocurrency hardware wallets made by Ledger, a French company whose popular products are designed to physically safeguard public and private keys used to receive or spend the user’s cryptocurrencies. KrebsOnSecurity, March 20, 2018

Want to steal movies, music, etc? Your Visit To Pirate Sites Exposes You To More Malware: CMU Research: All the pirates out there, you might want to hear this. A research conducted at Carnegie Mellon University has found that spending more time on pirate websites can potentially increase the risk of running into malware. Fossbytes, March 19, 2018

Firefox Master Password System Has Been Poorly Secured for the Past 9 Years: For at past nine years, Mozilla has been using an insufficiently strong encryption mechanism for the “master password” feature. BleepingComputer, March 18, 2018

Information Security Management in the Organization

Security Leadership

Boards Acknowledge Need to Better Manage Cyber Risk as the Consequences of a Breach Climb. A short video summarizing analysis of 5,000 Board Members in over 60 countries. Harvard Business Review, May 8, 2017

Information Security Management and Governance

7 Ways to Prepare for a Cybersecurity Audit: Data breaches, phishing attacks, information disclosure – the Internet can be a scary place. Conducting a cybersecurity audit (or getting a third-party assessment) is a great way to understand your organization’s cybersecurity posture. But, like preparing any exam or review, getting ready for a cybersecurity audit can be intimidating. While every security assessment will be a bit different, here are seven ways you can prepare for your next cybersecurity audit. CSO, March 22, 2018

Cyber Warning

GitHub: Our dependency scan has found four million security flaws in public repos: GitHub says its security scan for old vulnerabilities in JavaScript and Ruby libraries has turned up over four million bugs and sparked a major clean-up by project owners. ZDNet, March 22, 2018

Cybersecurity in Society

Cyber Crime

Hackers seize Atlanta’s network system, demand $51,000 in Bitcoin as ransom: Atlanta mayor Keisha Bottoms said on Thursday, March 22, that hackers attacked the city’s network system and encrypted data. The details are somewhat slim for now, but hackers reportedly used the SamSam ransomware and demand around $51,000 in Bitcoin to unlock the city’s seized computers. Atlanta is currently working with the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, Microsoft, and Cisco cybersecurity officials to determine the scope of the damage and regain control of the data held hostage. DigitalTrends, March 23, 2018

Sweden Sees Surge of Cybercrime with Crypto-Jacking Cases up 10,000%. Criminals switching to hijacking victims’ computers to mine cryptocurrency.: With the rise of the blockchain technology, we have seen the birth of a new type of cybercrime – crypto-jacking. In Sweden, this new scheme is currently enjoying a worrying growth as more and more electronic devices are getting attacked by hackers, reported TheLocal.se. Finance Magnates, March 22, 2018

Cyber Privacy

Survey: Americans Spent $1.4B on Credit Freeze Fees in Wake of Equifax Breach: Almost 20 percent of Americans froze their credit file with one or more of the big three credit bureaus in the wake of last year’s data breach at Equifax, costing consumers an estimated $1.4 billion, according to a new study. The findings come as lawmakers in Congress are debating legislation that would make credit freezes free in every state. KrebsOnSecurity, March 22, 2018

Rights groups oppose CLOUD Act, citing privacy, human rights compromises: Rights groups sounded the alarm over the recently introduced Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, ostensibly meant to streamline the process through which law enforcement accesses data across borders, saying that it instead would circumvent Fourth Amendment protections and put human rights activists at risk. SC Media, March 16, 2018

Cyber Defense

18.5 Million Websites Infected With Malware at Any Time. Average website is attacked 44 times every day: There are more than 1.86 billion websites on the internet. Around 1% of these — something like 18,500,000 — are infected with malware at a given time each week; while the average website is attacked 44 times every day. SecurityWeek, March 21, 2018

Reddit Bans Community Dedicated to Dark Web Markets: Reddit has banned /r/DarkNetMarkets, the site’s biggest community dedicated to discussions related to Dark Web marketplaces —sites dedicated to selling illegal products varying from weapons, drugs, malware, data breaches, DDoS services, fraud services, and more. BleepingComputer, March 21, 2018

Know Your Enemy

Hacker vs hacker: This cryptojacking malware kills off its rivals to ensure maximum profit: The cryptocurrency-mining malware uses highly aggressive tactics — which researchers have reverse engineered to help provide protection. ZDNet, March 23, 2018

A cybercriminal can rent DDoS attack for $10/h, $200/day. Banking botnets: $750/month. Exploit kits: $1,400/month. WordPress exploits: $100. ATM skimmers: $1,500. Hacking tutorials: $50. Credit cards go for $7 – $50: A report released today by US cloud security and compliance solutions firm Armor shines a light on the prices practiced on Dark Web markets for a wide range of cybercrime-related services. BleepingComputer, March 20, 2018

Cyber Freedom

Will Congress Lose Midterm Elections to Hackers? Republican & Democratic senators blasted DHS Secy Nielsen for poor state of country’s cybersecurity election preparations following Russia’s meddling in the 2016 presidential election.: State and local officials will not have the full range of much-needed cybersecurity practices and equipment in place for the November 6 U.S. midterm elections. But efforts underway might deliver much-needed improvements in time for the 2020 elections, Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen told a Senate committee Wednesday. BankInfoSecurity, March 22, 2018

National Cybersecurity

DNC “lone hacker” Guccifer 2.0 identified as Russian spy after opsec fail. If corroborated, may be the ‘smoking gun’ in the Mueller investigation.: Soon after the June 2016 announcement by CrowdStrike that the Democratic National Committee’s network had been the victim of a long-running breach perpetrated by Russian intelligence agencies, someone going by the name “Guccifer 2.0” suddenly materialized to take credit for the breach. Guccifer 2.0 started leaking internal DNC documents soon after. Intelligence officials and security experts have previously insisted that Guccifer 2.0 was in fact part of a Russian intelligence information operations campaign and not, as the person or persons behind the blog and social media accounts associated with the Guccifer 2.0 identity insisted, a Romanian hacker inspired by the original Guccifer. ars technica, March 23, 2018

‘Slingshot’ Campaign Outed by Kasperskysaid to be U.S. Operation Targeting Terrorists: Report: The Slingshot cyber espionage campaign exposed recently by Kaspersky Lab is a U.S. government operation targeting members of terrorist organizations, according to a media report. SecurityWeek, March 21, 2018

Threat of Russian cyber reprisal puts UK finance, power and water on high alert: Banks, energy and water companies are on maximum alert over the threat of a serious cyber-attack from Moscow as concern continues over the safety of Russian exiles in the UK. The Guardian, March 18, 2018

Cyber Enforcement

9 Iranians Indicted for Massive Hacking Scheme. Thousands of Professors Worldwide Allegedly Among Those Targeted: The U.S. Department of Justice has announced the indictment of nine Iranians alleged to have penetrated systems belonging to hundreds of U.S. and foreign universities, government entities and private companies to steal more than 31 terabytes of documents and data. BankInfoSecurity, March 23, 2018

 

 

 

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The content of this CRC-ICS Cyber News Update is provided for information purposes only. No claim is made as to the accuracy or authenticity of the content of this news update or incorporated into it by reference. No responsibility is taken for any information or services which may appear on any linked websites. The information provided is for individual expert use only.

 

 

Founded in 2015, the Cyber Research Center - Industrial Control Systems is a not for profit research & information sharing research center working on the future state of Physical & Cyber Protection and Resilience. CRC-ICS goals are to inform industries / critical infrastructures about the fast changing threats they are facing and the measures, controls and techniques that can be implemented to be prepared to deal with these cyber threats.

 

 

Cyber Research Center - Industrial Control Systems. 2018

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